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recherche particulière. Cela va des dispositifs 
de diagnostics socioéconomiques aux inter-
ventions politiques locales des acteurs sur les 
enjeux du travail et de l’emploi, en passant 
par des nouvelles formes de contestations 
dont l’actualité sociale récente fournit de 
nombreux exemples. Une structuration plus 
importante du cadre d’analyse des entrevues 
pourrait permettre de mettre en évidence la 
dimension cognitive recherchée et faire ressor-
tir les modes de réflexivité des acteurs dans la 
construction de l’action collective.
Enfin, sur le plan juridique et législatif, 
il s’agirait de discuter des formes possibles 
de propriété collective du travail hors du 
lien d’entreprise, alors que de nombreuses 
recherches mettent l’emphase sur le renouveau 
des métiers comme forme de socialisation du 
contenu du travail ou sur les sites de production 
et d’intégration des activités économiques 
comme niveau pertinent de l’action syndicale 
(dans le secteur du commerce par exemple). 
La négociation sociale territorialisée (p. 264) 
peut ainsi servir à étendre les droits collectifs 
des personnes dans les milieux de travail dès 
lors que les enjeux sociaux qui y sont attachés 
ont été documentés et objectivés par la 
production de connaissances collectives. 
Frédéric Hanin
Université Laval
Why David Sometimes Wins: 
Leadership, Organization, and 
Strategy in the California Farm 
Worker Movement
By Marshall Ganz, New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2009, 368 pp., ISBN 978-0-19-516201-1.
Precarious employment and California 
agribusiness have a long and checkered 
history together. Despite the efforts of the 
state’s labour movement over the first half of 
the twentieth century to improve the working 
conditions of farm workers, successes were few 
and far between. In the 1960’s, Cesar Chavez 
and the United Farm Workers (UFW) succeeded 
where many others had failed. At Chavez’s 
side in this fight for union recognition, or La 
Causa as it was known, was Marshall Ganz. 
As an author, Ganz draws on his experience 
as an insider to provide an insightful account 
of how grassroots organizing can better the 
odds of achieving its objectives.
The author begins with a straightforward 
research question to frame his analysis: what 
were the essential elements of the UFW’s 
success? This first chapter then turns to an 
overview of the analytical framework Ganz has 
built to respond to his question. He argues that 
turning opportunity into the desired outcome 
was dependant upon three key processes: the 
motivation of the union leadership to actually 
address the concerns of those they purported 
to represent; the breadth of access to diverse 
sources of information and resources and 
finally; organizational flexibility that adapts to 
change and learns from its mistakes. According 
to the author, the degree to which these 
behaviours, or strategic capacity are present in 
a social movement is positively related to the 
achievement of its objectives. To support this 
hypothesis, Ganz compares the actions of the 
UFW with those of its rival unions.
In the next two chapters, the author explains 
how the UFW succeeded at representing itself 
as the only long-term solution to the plight of 
farm workers. In the first half of the twentieth 
century, radical elements within the labour 
movement were among the few to try to 
organize farm labour. Recalcitrant employers 
often countered by allowing the mainstream 
labour movement to organize packing and 
canning workers. Meanwhile, legislative 
exceptionalism that impeded the majority of 
farm workers from forming unions, alongside 
State support of the Bracero programme of 
temporary labour from Mexico, tended to 
strengthen the employer’s hand. In the 1950’s, 
a nascent organization, which would become 
the UFW, focused on specifically improving the 
lives of a labour force composed, by this time, 
mostly of recent immigrants. This narrative 
of events serves as the cornerstone of the 
author’s argument that the UFW’s growth 
was due in part to its ability to remain single-
mindedly accountable to farm workers. 
In chapters four, five and six, Ganz fleshes 
out his strategic capacity theory, linking 
the UFW’s accountability advantage to the 
strength of its weak ties and its organizational 
flexibility. A window of opportunity opened 
with the end of the Bracero programme. 
Faced with limited financial resources, the 
UFW used fieldworkers as union organizers, 
some of whom became part of the leadership 
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team. This maintained lines of communication 
with the base and legitimated union objectives 
among existing and potential membership. In 
likening his cause to that of contemporary 
civil rights and anti poverty movements, 
Chavez also reached out to city dwellers. 
Civil disobedience, high profile marches and 
consumer boycotts became on-the-job training 
for participation in a social movement that had 
to constantly adapt to serve an increasingly 
heterogeneous constituency. The volunteer 
social activists that were attracted to La Causa 
allowed the UFW to avoid being beholden to 
any financial benefactor, a necessary condition 
for organizational flexibility. At the same 
time, the UFW gained access to a broad cross 
section of individuals with a wealth of ideas 
to contribute. 
David’s victories versus Goliath turned 
out to be bittersweet. Strategic strikes, often 
at harvest time, were used to extract wage 
agreements, field by field. But employers 
preferred doing business with the Hoffa 
tainted Teamsters. As a result, the UFW 
entered into a mutually beneficial alliance 
with the AFL-CIO that preserved the former’s 
independence. Eventually, the UFW had the 
entire table grape industry under contract 
and ultimately, won state specific legislation 
that accorded farm workers the right to 
union protection. Ganz then makes use of 
his strategic capacity theory to explain the 
decline in the fortunes of the UFW as a social 
movement. Accountability to the leader and 
not the membership became paramount. 
Commiserations among a restricted circle 
of insiders could not provide the access to a 
broad base of informational resources that the 
innovative approach required. As a result, the 
organizational flexibility of the union began to 
resemble political sclerosis. 
Ganz’s analysis makes full use of a 
research perspective that maintains economic 
behaviour is heavily influenced by the social 
network to which an individual belongs. In 
turn, being a member in good standing in 
the network usually requires compliance with 
its norms of behaviour. Still, it is the actions 
of individuals that are key to the success of 
the network. Hence, access to novel sources 
of information provides different ideas on 
how to achieve objectives, which are then 
adapted to mesh with the network’s norms. 
In this case, the UFW adapted its behaviour 
to take better advantage of its independence 
and organizational flexibility. Yet, by assuming 
the profile of a civil rights movement, the 
UFW set a standard for economic behaviour 
that they themselves were unable to maintain. 
Ultimately, the UFW seems to have evolved 
into the very labour organization they had 
hoped to distance themselves from. 
Yes, as seen in Ganz’s recent work with the 
Obama election campaign, collective action 
can realistically aim to overcome injustice. But, 
people tend to belong to several networks 
at once. As is often the case with temporary 
immigration, social ties develop which lead 
to permanent residency and a desire to share 
in the American dream. As we saw, requisite 
norms of behaviour evolved within the UFW 
over time because it also wanted to placate 
a broader political constituency. In interacting 
with elements outside the network, the UFW 
proved unable to maintain a firewall against 
behaviours that undermined its strategic 
capacity. So, did the UFW become a different 
version of the same network, or a completely 
different network? Those who wish to 
emulate Ganz’s approach to organizing would 
benefit from an analysis that takes account 
of acceptable and unacceptable behaviour, 
politically speaking, across multiple networks.
sheldon Keith
Université Laval
L’argent noir des syndicats
Par Roger Lenglet, Jean-Luc Touly et Christophe 
Mongermont, Paris : Fayard, 2008, 297 p., ISBN 
978-2-213-63282-7.
Voilà un ouvrage très franco-français, dépour-
vu de toute ambition scientifique, qui s’inscrit 
dans le sillage du scandale récent (2008) sur 
les versements de fonds qui auraient transité 
d’une organisation patronale (Union des in-
dustries et des métiers de la métallurgie) vers 
des organisations syndicales représentatives et 
cela au plus haut niveau. Pour qui suit l’ac-
tualité syndicale hexagonale, la question du 
financement des syndicats français n’est pas 
nouvelle. Comment en effet les syndicats 
français peuvent-ils survivre de façon indépen-
dante sur le plan financier dans un contexte 
de taux de syndicalisation anémique (sous la 
barre des 10 %), alors que les organisations 
